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Judge Richard G. Sumsion 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. WHEN AN INJURED EMPLOYEE HAS NOT 
BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE THE DATE OF INJURY, IS 
UNEMPLOYABLE, AND CANNOT BE REHABILITATED, 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS OUT OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND SHOULD" 
PROPERLY BE FOR SUCH PERIOD OF TIME BEGINNING 
WITH THE TIME THAT PAYMENTS MADE BY THE 
EMPLOYER OR ITS INSURANCE CARRIER TERMINATE. 
In its brief, respondent Second Injury Fund (the Fund) takes 
the position that the sole issue before the Court is whether or 
not the Commission's designation of July 25, 1985, as the 
appropriate date for commencement of permanent total disability 
benefits was "wholly unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
record." (Brief of Second Injury Fund, p. 20, first full 
paragraph.) The Fund relies, in part, on Oman v. Industrial Com'n 
of Utah, 735 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1987), and the following 
statement therein: 
There is no statutory language requiring 
benefits to commence at either the date of 
injury or the last day of employment
 f 
whichever occurs later. 
735 P.2d at 666. In Oman, however, the Court was responding to 
the plaintifffs contention that benefits should have commenced 
from the day after his last day of work, rather than from the date 
of medical confirmation of his total disability. Id. The Court 
found substantial evidence existed for commencing benefits on the 
date of the confirmation. The plaintiff had continued to work 
after his injury andf according to the Court, "it was not until 
years later that the injury developed to a point of total 
disability." Id. 
Unlike the plaintiff in Oman, the appellant in this case did 
not continue to work after his injury and he has been permanently 
and totally disabled since the time of his injury. Dr. Chapman 
found his ability to work inadequate to provide support on 
February 16
 f 1978 (RI, p. 56.) Dr. Powell found him "totally 
disabled for any physical labor and probably . . . unable to 
perform nonphysical sedentary work" as of June 20, 1978 (RI, pp. 
65-70.) Administrative Law Judge Sohm found him permanently and 
totally disabled in May of 1979 (R.l, pp. 124-127.) Dr. McNaught 
stated he had been unable to work since 1976 on July 25, 1985 (R2, 
p. 180, 181.) Administrative Law Judge Sumsion, in a January 1986 
letter, conceded that it appeared appellant was not only 
permanently and totally disabled but had been from the time of his 
industrial injury (R2, p. 77.) And, the medical panel appointed 
by Judge Sumsion, found that the appellant, though not rendered 
unemployable on the basis of physical impairment, was unemployable 
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as of October 1, 1981 (R2, pp. 130, 131.) Under these 
circumstances, appellant's benefits should properly commence from 
the date payments of his permanent partial benefits from the 
employer terminated. 
Procedure for payment of permanent total disability is set 
forth in § 35-1-67, Utah Code Ann., which states, in pertinent 
part: 
A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability shall in all cases be tentative and 
not final until such time as the following 
proceedings have been had: If the employee 
has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory 
that the industrial commission of Utah 
refer the employee to the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education for rehabilitation 
training . . . . I f the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial 
commission of Utah in writing that the 
employee has fully cooperated with the 
division of vocational rehabilitation in its 
efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the 
opinion of the division the employee may not 
be rehabilitated, the commission shall order 
that there be paid to the employee weekly 
benefits . . . for such period of time 
beginning with the time that the payments, as 
in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate 
and ending with the death of the employee. 
The Fund stipulated, and the Commission accepted the fact, that 
the applicant may not be rehabilitated. The applicant argued at 
the time of the initial finding of permanent total disability that 
he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits, but the 
Commission deferred consideration of his argument until at least 
March 1, 1981, allowed him to file for a further determination 
a f t e r t h a t time f and ordered tha t he received permanent p a r t i a l 
impairment benef i t s from his employer u n t i l October 6, 1981. The 
a p p l i c a n t c a n n o t be p e n a l i z e d b e c a u s e he d id no t a p p l y 
immedia te ly , upon exp i ra t ion of h is benef i t s from his employer, 
for h is permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benef i t s nor for the f a i l u r e of 
Judge Sohm or the Commission to order benef i t s pursuant to 
§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 7 . As the record shows, Judge Sohm and the Commission 
perceived some hope tha t fur ther medical procedures might improve 
the a p p e l l a n t ' s condi t ion , and, poss ibly for t ha t reason, did not 
fo l low the d i c t a t e s of § 35-1-67 upon f i n d i n g the a p p l i c a n t 
permanently t o t a l l y d i sab led . 
The only evidence the Fund c i t e s to support the Commission's 
decis ion i s evidence of fur ther d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the a p p l i c a n t ' s 
c o n d i t i o n . This evidence merely shows, however, t ha t the hoped 
for improvement of the a p p l i c a n t ' s condit ion did not occur. The 
only reasonable date for commencement of the bene f i t s in t h i s case 
i s t h e t ime t h a t t h e payments t o be made by the employer 
t e r m i n a t e d . I t i s t h e o n l y d a t e suppor ted by s u b s t a n t i a l 
evidence. In Oman, supra , the Court s t a t e d : 
I t i s w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t he 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission t o d e t e r m i n e t h e 
commencement d a t e of b e n e f i t s fo r t o t a l 
p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y so l o n g a s t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s suppor ted by s u b s t a n t i a l 
evidence and not pa ten t ly unreasonable. 
735 P.2d a t 667 (emphasis added.) When doctors and admin is t ra t ive 
law judges have regarded the a p p l i c a n t as permanently t o t a l l y 
disabled since 1979, a determination tha t benef i t s for permanent 
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y should not be paid u n t i l 1985 i s p a t e n t l y 
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unreasonable. The commencement date chosen by the commission is 
arbitrary/ chosen in large part due to its coincidence * with the 
applicant's renewed request for his benefits. 
POINT II. THE WORKERS1 COMPENSATION LAWS ARE 
TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED, AND ANY DOUBT 
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IS TO BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED EMPLOYEE. 
The Fundfs argument that the Commission's decision must stand 
unless it is "wholly unsupported by substantial evidence" does not 
accurately reflect the standard to be applied to review of 
Commission decisions or the policy behind the workers1 
compensation law. The appellate courts have repeatedly stated 
that their review of Commission decisions involves the 
determination whether the decision was "supported by substantial 
evidence." The difference between the statements regarding the 
standard on review is not one of mere semantics. Under the 
standard as the Fund states itr a scintilla of evidence, a fact 
here, a question of fact there, could suffice to support a 
Commission decision. But under the standard stated as the Court 
states it, and applies it, a shred of evidentiary support will not 
suffice; the decision must be supported by substantial evidence. 
In Norton v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), the 
Supreme Court expressed the distinction in words reiterrating a 
basic tenet of workers1 compensation law: 
It need not be restated at great length that 
the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be 
liberally construed and that any doubt with 
respect to the right of compensation will be 
resolved in favor of the iniured employee. 
728 P.2d at 1028. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Injury Fund has not addressed the issue whether 
deterioration of condition is or is not requisite to commencement 
of benefits for an employee previously found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, nor has it addressed the burden the "odd-lot" 
doctrine places on one who contests commencement of payment, or 
the fact it is not the province of a medical panel to determine 
employability. Instead, the Fund has argued the facts of the case 
and sought to show that the Commission's decision was not "wholly 
unsupported by substantial evidence" and was, therefore, supported 
by substantial evidence* The record shows, however, that the 
decision of the Commission is not supported by substantial 
evidence and that the Commission, like the Fund, failed to 
consider the issues appellant sets forth in his brief, which 
issues were material to the decision presented to the Commission 
by his case. Appellant respectfully requests the Court to 
consider all of the issues raised on this appeal and to reverse 
the Commission's decision and order commencement of his benefits 
as of October 6, 1981. The commencement date set forth by the 
Commission was not determined by application of the law or 
supported by substantial evidence. 
DATED this rtkf day of January, 1988. 
Wendy Mosiley 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Norton v. Industrial Com'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) 
NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N 
Cite as 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 1025 
than that encountered in non-employment 
life and are therefore legally sufficient. 
The medical causation test is likewise satis-
fied by the medical panel's finding that 
"the work activities as described over a 
three-day period could produce a lumbar 
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem 
he had had." No more is needed to hold 
that Miera suffered a compensable indus-
trial accident. 
The case is remanded for a medical eval-
uation of Miera's industrial injury in pro-
portion to his previous disability and a com-
mensurate apportionment of benefit pay-
ments between the Second Injury Fund and 
the State Insurance Fund. Costs are 
awarded to Miera. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
J: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Bruce D. NORTON, Plaintiff, 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, United States Steel 
Corporation, [Self-insured Employer], 
and the Second Injury Fund of the 
State of Utah, Defendants. 
No. 21017. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 25, 1986. 
In petition for review, worker chal-
lenged decision of Industrial Commission 
denying his claim for permanent total dis-
ability. The Supreme Court held that find-
ing that worker was not permanently total-
ly disabled was not supported by sufficient 
evidence where Industrial Commission 
failed to consider worker's vocational histo-
ry, educational limitations, learning disabili-
ty, and age, in concert with his multiple 
disabling condition and need for total reed-
ucation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Workers' Compensation <3=>1639 
Finding that worker was not perma-
nently totally disabled was not supported 
by sufficient evidence where Industrial 
Commission failed to consider worker's vo-
cational history, educational limitations, 
learning disability, and age, in concert with 
his multiple disabling conditions and need 
for total reeducation. 
2. Workers' Compensation <§=>847 
Fact that worker continued work for 
six years after accident, standing alone, did 
not foreclose worker's claim that he was 
permanently totally disabled where worker 
spent those six years in considerable pain. 
3. Workers' Compensation <3=5847 
Relevant factors in determining wheth-
er worker who returned to work after acci-
dent is permanently totally disabled include 
probable dependability with which injured 
worker can sell his services in competitive 
labor market, probability of future impair-
ment of future earning capacity as indi-
cated by nature of injury, age of worker, 
and other relevant factors. 
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>1377 
Only where employee returns to work 
after accident under normal conditions will 
presumption of no loss of earning capacity 
stay unassailed. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for Indus. Com'n. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury. 
Phil N. Walker, San Francisco, Cal., for 
U.S. Steel. 
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PER CURIAM: 
In this petition for review, petitioner 
Bruce D. Norton challenges the decision of 
the Industrial Commission denying his 
claim for permanent total disability. Nor-
ton contends that the Commission errone-
ously based its findings on medical impair-
ment alone without examining his earning 
capacity, ignored his total disability under 
the "odd-lot" doctrine, and ruled contrary 
to the evidence produced by him in support 
of his claim. None of the defendant par-
ties has filed a response. We reverse and 
remand for a hearing consistent with this 
opinion. 
Norton was employed as a coal miner of 
United States Steel in East Carbon, Utah, 
for thirty-nine years of his life. He was 
sixteen years old when he began working 
full-time in 1943 and fifty-six when he 
stopped working in 1983. He earned a 
living throughout those years by dint of his 
brawn, performing arduous physical labor 
that required little, if any, skills. Norton's 
literacy is marginal at best. 
On August 10, 1977, Norton sustained an 
injury to his neck and shoulder when a 
pulley malfunctioned and sent a heavy ca-
ble crashing down on his neck with such 
force that his face was embedded in the 
coal and he had to be pried out from under 
the cable by his companions. Initial diag-
nosis was contusion over base of neck, no 
fracture. Norton returned to work after 
one week wearing a soft collar. Because 
of persistent pain, he was given a myelo-
gram in December which showed a herniat-
ed disc at C5-C6 interspace and right 
shoulder traumatic bursitis. Moderate irri-
tation of the right C6-C7 nerve roots was 
found as well. Traction and heat were 
prescribed as conservative treatment, with 
a possibility of surgery indicated. Norton 
continued to suffer persistent headaches 
and neck pain which have worsened with 
time, apparently symptoms of residual 
spondylosis and spurring. His company 
physician advised him that the day would 
come when he would want to have surgery. 
Norton was reluctant to take that step and 
informed his supervisor that inasmuch as 
he had elected not to have surgery, he 
should also take himself off compensation 
and return to work. 
Throughout his remaining working 
years, Norton intermittently underwent 
traction and physical therapy, wore a back 
brace, and took pain medication. During 
the last eighteen months of his work his 
legs felt numb whenever he turned slight-
ly, and at one point he experienced a fif-
teen to twenty minute paralysis of his left 
lower extremity. His left-hand grip and 
strength of the left arm continued to de-
crease to a point where he would drop 
objects and frequently lose feelings in his 
fingers at night. Nonetheless, he worked 
until March of 1983 when he took a medical 
retirement. 
Norton's prior injuries included a broken 
back when he was thirteen years old, re-
sisting in lumbar spine degenerative joint 
disease, right ankle traumatic arthritis 
stemming from a broken ankle, bilateral 
inguinal hernia for which he has been in 
surgery three times, hyperacidity with his-
tory of duodenal ulcer and focal skin can-
cers. Impairments developed after the in-
dustrial injury include tendovaginitis of the 
right little finger, pulmonary allergic bron-
chitis, and hypertensive cardiovascular dis-
ease with cardiomyopathy aggravated by 
life-long obesity. 
Norton was pronounced ineligible for re-
habilitation by the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation before the Commission ren-
dered its final decision. 
Basing his findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law partially upon the report of a 
medical panel, and partially upon the report 
of Norton's own physicians, the administra-
tive law judge found a 14% whole man 
impairment attributable to pre-existing con-
ditions, a 10% uncombined permanent phys-
ical impairment as a result of the industrial 
accident, raising the overall impairment to 
23% of the whole man, and a 31% impair-
ment as a result of all causes that devel-
oped subsequent to the industrial accident. 
1. Norton's challenge to the percentages found by the medical panel and adopted by the admin-
NORTON v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N 
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The administrative law judge then conclud-
ed that this impairment construed in a light 
most favorable to Norton did not require a 
finding of permanent total disability. The 
administrative law judge noted the impair-
ments that followed the industrial accident, 
stressed the fact that Norton continued to 
work for six more years after the accident, 
concluded that the evidence clearly did not 
warrant a determination that Norton was 
permanently and totally disabled as a con-
sequence of his industrial accident and 
therefore denied that claim. Nowhere in 
the findings, conclusions and order, or in 
the affirmance of that order by the Board 
of Review is there any mention about Nor-
ton's eligibility for rehabilitation. No find-
ings were made on Norton's earning capac-
ity in his field of endeavor or elsewhere. It 
is this lack of findings that mandates a 
reversal and remand for further proceed-
ings. 
Under our well-settled standard of re-
view, we are limited to determining wheth-
er the Commission's findings are supported 
by substantial evidence. Hardman v. Salt 
Lake City Fleet Management, Utah, 725 
P.2d 1323 (1986) (citations omitted). But 
where the findings of fact do not support 
the award, this Court may set aside the 
Commission's award. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-
1-84(2). 
[1] As in Hardman, supra, where it 
confused the percentage of impairment, a 
medical finding, with the percentage of dis-
ability, an administrative evaluation of 
earning capacity, the Commission again 
failed in this case to carry out its task. It 
adopted with slight modification the find-
ings of impairment reported by the medi-
cal panel but then failed in its administra-
tive responsibility and function to evaluate 
Norton's permanent disability which 
should have included such factors as Nor-
ton's "present and future ability to engage 
in gainful activity as it is affected by such 
istrative law judge must be rejected. The rating 
is proper under the formula explained in Sec-
ond Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill and Cabinet 
Shop, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984), and Jacobsen 
Construction v. Hair, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983). 
diverse factors as age, sex, education, eco-
nomic and social environment, in addition 
to the definite medical factor—permanent 
impairment." 2 As this Court has stated in 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984): 
This ability is evaluated not in the ab-
stract, but in terms of the specific indi-
vidual who has suffered a work related 
injury [I]n assessing the lack of 
earning capacity, a constellation of 
factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment. Other 
factors are age, education, training and 
mental capacities. [Citations omitted.] 
It is the unique configuration of these 
factors that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on the individu-
al's earning capacity. 
Accord Hardman at 1326-1327. No men-
tion is made of those other factors here, in 
spite of the fact that the Commission had 
before it the evaluation of the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation that spells out 
Norton's vocational history, educational 
limitations, learning disability and age "in 
concert with his multiple disabling condi-
tions and a r^ed for total re-education." 
That evaluation presents prima facie evi-
dence that Norton, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, is so handicapped 
that he will not be employed regularly in 
any well-known branch of the labor mar-
ket, Marshall at 212, and therefore falls 
into the so-called "odd-lot" category. 
Hardman at 1327. 
[2-4] With respect to the administrative 
law judge's finding that Norton's continued 
work for six years was proof that he was 
not permanently totally disabled in 1983, it 
should be pointed out that that fact stand-
ing alone does not foreclose Norton's claim. 
The administrative law judge correctly con-
sidered Norton's return to work as one 
factor to be weighed in determining his 
disability. He erred when he failed to con-
2. See the Commission's own explanation of the 
difference between impairment and disability in 
Northwest Carriers Inc. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1981). 
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sider the condition under which Norton 
continued his employment, as manifested 
by his finding "the very fact that the appli-
cant continued to work in underground 
mining for six years following his accident 
is convincing evidence that his accident did 
not render him permanently and totally 
disabled/' Norton's decision to return to 
work did not automatically disqualify him 
from receiving permanent total disability 
benefits, where the facts indicate that 
throughout the remainder of his employ he 
was not restored to health. The evidence 
is undisputed that Norton spent the last six 
of his working years in considerable pain. 
Provided that a worker's disability was also 
analyzed within the framework of the odd-
lot doctrine, case law dealing with the 
factor of substantial pain has generally 
held that "[a] worker who cannot return to 
any gainful employment without suffering 
substantial pain is entitled to compensation 
benefits for total disability." Comeaux v. 
Cameron Offshore Services, Inc., 420 
So.2d 1209 (La.App.1982). 
The presence of substantial pain may 
logically cause an injured worker to fall 
into this odd-lot category, inasmuch as it 
directly affects the probable dependabili-
ty with which the injured worker can sell 
his services in a competitive labor mar-
ket, undistorted by such factors as busi-
ness booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary luck, or 
the superhuman efforts of the claimant 
to rise above his crippling handicaps. 
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 
So.2d 1252, 1254 (La.1980), modified 434 
So.2d 177 (La.App.1983) (benefits affirmed 
on substantial pain theory alone), citing 
L. A. Larson, The Law of Workman }s Com-
pensation § 10-164.49 (1980). The proba-
bility of future impairment of future earn-
ing capacity as indicated by the nature of 
the injury, the age of the worker, and other 
relevant factors must likewise be assessed. 
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Taylor, 468 
S.W.2d 318 (Ky.1971). See also Harwell v. 
Argonaut Insurance Co., 296 Or. 505, 678 
P.2d 1202 (1984); Tsuchiyama v. Kahului 
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 2 Hawaii App. 
659, 638 P.2d 1381 (1982); Smith v. Indus-
trial Commission, 113 Ariz. 304, 552 P„2d 
1198 (1976). Only where the employee re-
turns to work under normal conditions will 
the presumption of no loss of earning ca-
pacity stay unassailed. Midland-Ross 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 
311, 486 P.2d 793 (1971). 
It may be years before the effect is felt. 
But a man with a stiffened arm or dam-
aged back or badly weakened eye will 
presumably have a harder time doing his 
work well and meeting the competition of 
young and healthy men. When a man 
stands before the worker's compensation 
court with proven permanent physical in-
juries, for which the exclusive remedy 
has abolished all possibility of common 
law damages, it is not justifiable to tell 
him he has undergone no impairment of 
earning capacity, solely on the strength 
of current paychecks. 
Cleveland v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals, 
196 Mont. 15, 636 P.2d 1386 (1981), citing 
Fermo v. Superline Products, 175 Mont. 
345, 574 P.2d 251 (1978). U need not be 
restated at great length that the Work-
men's Compensation Act is to be liberally 
construed and that any doubt with respect 
to the right of compensation will be re-
solved in favor of the injured employee. 
State Tax Commission v. Industrial Com-
mission, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984); 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
Upon remand the Commission is required 
to address Norton's disability in light of 
all factors mentioned ante, and the burden 
will be on the employer to prove the exist-
ence of regular, steady work that Norton 
could perform, taking into account his age, 
limited education, and functional illiteracy, 
as well as his disabling pain. Contrary to 
the Commission's disclaimer noted in 
Northwest Carriers at 140, n. 3, perma-
nent impairment alone is never the sole or 
real criterion of permanent disability, and 
a denial of permanent total disability based 
on it alone invites reversal under well-set-
tled stare decisis. 
The matter is remanded for further pro-
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Charles G. OMAN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
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3. Workers' Compensation <s=*1949 
Possible gap between full development 
of disability and payment of benefits will 
not justify reversal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Peabody Coal Company, Old Republic 
Insurance Company and Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
No. 860189-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 15, 1987. 
Worker sought modification of order 
by Industrial Commission awarding him 
permanent total disability benefits, and 
payment of interest on benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: 
(1) award of permanent total disability ben-
efits to commence as of date permanent 
total disability was first medically con-
firmed was not abuse of discretion in view 
of progressive nature of worker's disabili-
ty, and (2) worker was entitled to payment 
of accrued interest on all unpaid benefits 
commencing from date of medical confir-
mation. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
1. Workers' Compensation <s=>1939.11(9) 
In reviewing date of commencement of 
total permanent disability benefits, court 
must determine if Industrial Commission's 
order was supported by substantial evi-
dence and was reasonable exercise of Com-
mission's discretion. 
2. Workers* Compensation <s=*868 
Commencement of award for perma-
nent total disability on date permanent to-
tal disability was first medically confirmed, 
and not on date of industrial accident or on 
date worker was last employed for employ-
er, was not abuse of discretion in view of 
progressive nature of worker's psychiatric 
disability and difficulty of determining ex-
act date of maturation of disability. U.C. 
A.1953, 35-1-67. 
4. Workers' Compensation <s=>1939.11(9) 
It is within sound discretion of Indus-
trial Commission to determine commence-
ment date of benefits for total permanent 
disability so long as determination is sup-
ported by substantial evidence and not pat-
ently unreasonable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-67. 
5. Workers' Compensation @»1041 
Worker who was awarded permanent 
total disability benefits as of date perma-
nent total disability was first medically con-
firmed was entitled to payment of accrued 
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing 
from date of medical confirmation. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-78. 
Henry K. Chai, II, Snow, Christensen & 
Martmeau, Salt Lake City, for Peabody 
Coal Co. 
Erie V. Boorman, Adm'r Second Injury 
Fund, Salt Lake City. 
Virginius Dabney, Dabney & Dabney, 
P.C., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and 
BENCH, JJ. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order 
by the Industrial Commission awarding 
him permanent total disability benefits. 
The benefits were to commence as of Sep-
tember 24, 1984, the date permanent total 
disability was first medically confirmed. 
Plaintiff urges benefits should commence 
from either the day of the industrial acci-
dent (May 12, 1975) or the day after he last 
worked for the employer (April 22, 1976), 
whichever is later. Under that theory ben-
efits would commence as of April 23, 1976. 
Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest on 
the benefits, which was denied by the In-
dustrial Commission. 
Plaintiff was injured in a mine cave-in on 
May 12, 1975 in Huntington, Utah, while 
working for Peabody Coal Company ('Tea-
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body"). He was treated orthopedically for 
back problems and also received treatment 
for depression. He returned to work on 
June 15, 1975, but continued to receive 
medical treatment. On June 29, 1976, a 
three level fusion operation was performed 
on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further 
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiffs 
back. Plaintiff was awarded compensation 
for a 25% permanent partial impairment of 
the whole body for his back problems on 
March 21, 1977. 
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a 
permanent total disability award because 
of psychiatric impairment. Plaintiffs to-
tal disability was confirmed by a letter 
dated September 9, 1984, from his physi-
cian. The doctor's confirmation was cor-
roborated by other medical and mental 
health professionals. The Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ), in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a tenta-
tive finding of permanent total disability 
and referred plaintiff to the Division of 
Rehabilitative Services for evaluation, 
training and certification. The Division 
found that plaintiff could not be rehabilitat-
ed for employment. The A U entered find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and an 
order providing plaintiff with benefits from 
July 21, 1985, the date of certification by 
the Division of Rehabilitation. No interest 
on unpaid benefits was awarded Plaintiff 
then filed a Motion for Reconsidera-
tion/Motion for Review challenging the 
commencement date of benefits and failure 
to order payment of interest. In response 
the Industrial Commission denied payment 
of interest but changed the benefit com-
mencement date to September 24, 1984, the 
first date of medicaJ confirmation, 
[1] Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that 
benefits should commence from April 23, 
1976, the day after plaintiffs last day of 
work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating 
commencement of workers' compensation 
no later than three days after the injury. 
However, that section deals with total tem-
porary disability rather than total perma-
nent disability as in this case. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses "at the 
time of injury" language to establish bene-
fits, but only in conjunction with wages at 
the time of injury. There is no statutory 
language requiring benefits to commence 
at either the date of injury or the last day 
of employment, whichever occurs later. 
Therefore, plaintiffs argument is without 
merit. Thus, this Court must determine if 
the Commission's order was supported by 
substantial evidence and was a reasonable 
exercise of the Commission's discretion. 
Norton v. Indus. Commission, 728 P.2d 
1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
[2,3] In this instance, while the acci-
dent causing the initial injury occurred in 
1975, it was not until years later that the 
injury developed to a point of total disabili-
ty. The ALJ considered evidence that 
plaintiff had operated a business and re-
ceived income between 1976 (when he 
stopped working for Peabody) and 1984. 
The ALJ's findings state that "[a]U of the 
evidence presented by the defendants was 
convincing in showing the [plaintiff] is far 
from being urtally invalid." Benefits were 
awarded nonetheless, consistent with the 
standard referred to in Norton, 728 P.2d 
1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court 
stated that a worker may receive benefits 
who is not completely incapacitated but is 
sufficiently handicapped so "that he will 
not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market." Nor-
ton, 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not 
totally and permanently disabled in 1976. 
His psychiatric problems, which emanated 
from the 1975 industrial accident, became 
progressively worse, finally culminating in 
total permanent disability. As found by 
the ALJ, "[plaintiff] did not become perma-
nently and totally disabled until after the 
expiration of the initial six year period." 
The Industrial Commission did not act un-
reasonably nor abuse its discretion by se-
lecting the September 24, 1984, date for 
commencement of benefits given the pro-
gressive nature of plaintiff's disability and 
the difficulty of determining the exact date 
of maturation of the disability. A possible 
gap between full development of the dis-
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ability and payment of benefits will not 
justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp, 720 P.2d 
1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the lan-
guage of Spencer v. Indus. Commission, 
87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935): 
. . . whether an employee is totally dis-
abled or permanently disabled are ulti-
mate matters to be decided by the com-
missioner, as is also the amount and time 
compensation may be awarded upon all 
the evidence. Id. at 197. 
[4] It is within the sound discretion of 
the Industrial Commission to determine the 
commencement date of benefits for total 
permanent disability so long as the deter-
mination is supported by substantial evi-
dence and not patently unreasonable. Sub-
stantial evidence existed in this case for 
commencing benefits as of the first date of 
medical confirmation of permanent total 
disability. 
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial 
Commission's denial of interest on unpaid 
benefits. Plaintiff relies on Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commis-
sion shall include interest at the rate of 
8% per annum from the date when each 
benefit payment would have otherwise 
become due and payable. 
[5] In Marshall v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) the Utah 
Supreme Court held that this statute must 
be retroactively applied to accrued or pend-
ing actions because its intent is remedial. 
The case before us clearly falls within the 
statutory language and pursuant to Mar-
shall enactment of the statute subsequent 
to the injury or disability is irrelevant. 
Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued 
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing 
from September 24, 1984. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
No costs awarded. 
GARFF and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
Cynthia DAHL, widow of Steven B. 
Dahl, deceased, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Revlon Service, Inc. 
and/or Liberty Mutual and/or Default 
Indemnity Fund, Defendants. 
No. 860215-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 15, 1987. 
Wife of deceased worker appealed 
from Industrial Commission's denial of her 
motion for review of order dismissing claim 
for dependent's death benefits The Court 
of Appeals, Davidson, J., held that, not-
withstanding facts that worker had filed 
for divorce and parties did not live togeth-
er, wife was dependent upon worker on 
date of his death for purposes of determin-
ing her eligibility for death benefits. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Workers' Compensation <$=3446 
Notwithstanding facts that deceased 
worker had filed for divorce and parties did 
not live together, deceased worker's wife 
was dependent upon decedent on date of 
his death for purposes of determining her 
eligibility for dependent's death benefits, 
where wife depended on worker to make 
full mortgage payment on their family 
home and to meet their joint debt pay-
ments. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-71(2), 35-1-73. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory, 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt 
Lake City, for Liberty Mutual Insurance. 
Susan Pixton, Adm'r, Default Indem. 
Fund, Utah Indus. Com'n, Salt Lake City. 
Frank J. Gustm, Kent M. Kasting, Gus-
tin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt Lake 
City, for Cynthia Dahl. 
ADDENDUM 3 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 
35-1-67 LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments — Vocational rehabilitation — Procedure 
and payments. 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 662/3% of 
his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a depen-
dent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, 
up to a maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. However, 
in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or its insurance 
carrier be required to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until such time as the following proceedings 
have been had: If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently 
and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the duty of 
the commission to order paid to the vocational rehabilitation division, out of 
the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed 
$1;000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the rehabili-
tation and training of the employee shall generally follow the practice appli-
cable under § 35-1-69, relating to the rehabilitation of employees having com-
bined injuries. If the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writing 
that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of vocational rehabil-
itation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division the 
employee may not be rehabilitated, the commission shall orcicjr that there be 
paid to the employee weekly benefits at the rate of no 2/3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% 
of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of 
four dependent minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with 
the time that the payments, as in this section provided, to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall be entitled to any such benefits if he fails or 
refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational rehabilitation under this 
section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to bene-
fits from the second injury fund under Subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those 
injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive not less than $120 per week when 
paid only by the second injury fund, or when combined with compensation 
payments of the employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational training of the em-
ployee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is 
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qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, after notice to the 
employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether the employee 
has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, 
or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total 
and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions of 
this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability is required 
in those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehabilitation 
effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, the award shall be 
based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
§§ 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 78; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3139; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-63; L. 1937, ch. 41, § 1; 1939, ch. 51, § 1; 
C. 1943,42-1-63; L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1949, ch. 
52, § 1; 1951, ch. 55, § 1; 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 
1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1959, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, ch. 
71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; 
1967, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 86, § 5; 1971, ch. 
76, § 6; 1973, ch. 67, § 4; 1974, ch. 13, § 1; 
1975, ch. 101, § 5; 1977, ch. 150, § 1; 1977, 
ch. 151, § 3; 1977, ch. 156, § 6; 1979, ch. 138, 
§ 2; 1981, ch. 286, § 1; 1983, ch. 356, § 1; 
1985, ch. 160, § 1. 
Compilers Notes. — The 1975 amendment 
substituted "85% of the state average weekly 
wage" for "662/3% of the state average weekly 
wage" four times in the first paragraph and 
once in the last paragraph; increased the mini-
mum benefit per week from $35 to $45 in the 
first paragraph, inserted "not to exceed the av-
erage weekly wage of the employee at the time 
of the injury" twice in the first paragraph, in-
creased the benefit per week from $50 to $60 at 
the end of the third paragraph (deleted by the 
1977 amendment) and near the end of the 
fourth paragraph (deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment), and substituted "July 1, 1975" for "July 
1, 1974" in the fourth paragraph (deleted by 
the 1977 amendment) 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 151 substi-
tuted "spouse" for "wife" in the first paragraph 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 156 made 
the same changes as the 1977 amendment by 
chapter 151; combined the first two paragraphs 
into one paragraph, inserted the second para-
graph, and deleted the former third and fourth 
paragraphs which read "Commencing July 1, 
1971, all persons who are permanently and 
totally disabled and on that date or prior 
thereto were receiving compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) shall be paid compensation benefits 
at the rate of $60 per week 
"Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who 
were permanently and totally disabled on or 
before March 5, 1949, and were receiving com-
pensation benefits and continue to receive such 
benefits shall be paid compensation benefits 
from the special fund provided for by section 
35-1-68(1) at a rate sufficient to bring their 
weekly benefit to $60 when combined with em-
ployer or insurance carrier compensation pay-
ments " 
The 1977 amendment by chapter 150, in the 
two paragraphs deleted by the 1977 amend-
ment by chapter 156 (quoted above) substi-
tuted "1977" for "1971" and "1975" and substi-
tuted "$75" for "$60.' 
The 1979 amendment increased the mini-
mum benefit m the second pa i^raph from $75 
to $85 
The 1981 amendment substituted "second in-
jury fund" for "special fund" throughout the 
section, and increased the amount in the sec-
ond paragraph from $85 to $100 
The 1983 amendment substituted "under 
this section" at the end of the first paragraph 
for "as set forth herein", increased the mini 
mum amount in the first sentence of the seconc 
paragraph from $100 to $110, and made minoi 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style 
The 1985 amendment substituted "$120" fo 
"$110" m the first sentence of the second para 
graph 
Effective Date. — Section 2 of Laws 198f 
ch 160 provided "This act takes effect upo 
approval by the governor, or the day followm 
the constitutional time limit of Article VI 
Sec 8 without the governor's signature, or i 
the case of a veto, the date of veto override 
Approved March 18, 1985 
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